...Your exposé of the logical incompatibility, or incompatible logicity, of the Realist' and Idealists' system in most excellent in your letter of 1 Jan. Also your description of the Laws of Thought in your letter of 5 Jan. On these, as with your other admirable and helpful expositions of structure I have no comment. You handle this elaborate and important subject with greater facility and competence than I do. Comment being therefore redundant, I offer simply applause. (Your elegant squares within squares have a third possible [interpretation[1]]: they are not a receding corridor but an advancing pyramid. Now which of the two is this:—
?)
The tone of one's letters, or anyone's for the matter of that, is always rather imponderable, since a letter, by its nature, is a tonal vacuum, which, not being a total vacuum, demands imperatively to be filled. What sort of filling will this demand? I shall, maybe, tap it against stones (to test its stones), twang it with plectra (to elicit its tonal spectra), hang it for a spell in an aeolian zephyr (to hear what it harps upon forever), rub it with a fingertip (and so on, ad lib.); but I doubt the only result will be the same dry rustle of a whisper (of more than which I must depair). What does it mean? (You may tell, if you can.)
"Correct me if I am wrong." you say (in parenthesis) of your statement of My Approach as it seems to you and of Your Approach. I would not say you were wrong or right. Only perhaps: "that was your way of putting it...". What follows will make no difference, though, to the extent that no difference makes a difference.
That Esse est percipi I by no means deny, though I think it incomplete. What is lacking? Nothing. How? Because, given that statement on its merits it implies (in order that it may emerge at all) percipiens non est.[2] (Non-esse est percipere[3]—perceive is a recul from being.) (It is not of the same order as cogito ergo sum, which, in terms of it, would be cogito ergo percipimur,[4] which seems a quaint non-sequitur.) That too I do not deny. Do you? But this is only a starting-point; for the self-identity of the percipiens quis perceptum est non esse[5] now enters, and with it ramifications that extend thence ad infinitum (hence, no doubt, Bishop Berkeley's absurd solution of this ambiguity by introduction of God's consciousness to contain the perceived while it is not being perceived).
Now I suggest that thenomena must, qua phenomena, be distinguishable from what they are not, or they do not arise at all. If so, and it they can, as such, be distinguished, it is from being, and so if they can be said to have a distinctive phenomenal characteristic peculiar to them, it is that when a phenomenon appears it does so as hiding something else (the three saṅkhatalakkhaṇas are not absent from my mind); but that when a search is made, on this invitation, for what ought to be beyond it, only further phenomena ever appear when it disappears. On these terms consciousness could be said to appear, as the phenomenon that hides nothing when it appears. Again, if being, which phenomena are not, has, as such, an ontological characteristic peculiar to it, it is that it has nothing beyond it. A phenomenon, then, while thus certain in its phenomenality, is ambiguous in its being. But if, as is always possible, the ambiguity in the being of the phenomenon is dialectically resolved, it reappears again in what being is not, i.e. in phenomena as their non-phenomenality. All this, in its repetitive pattern and infinite ramifications, vistas and hierarchies, levels, planes and ranges (which you so admirably masterfully deal with) is what the structure of being consists in. I say, Here is the double ambiguity "whose naming (i.e. reasoning) kills and has it born elsewhere" (if I may misquote myself), or, on a baser level, the hippo with the tight skin (but see what I say below on ambiguities as ultimate entities).
Since Avijjāpaccayā... bhavo, I hold it not impossible that (the logical constant the copula "is" being bhava on the verbal plane) the three Laws of Thought may well be, not so much the structure of being (since you say the structure of being is what they are founded on) as the structure of saddhā (you know, I believe, my views on the intimate connexion between saddhā and avijjā in the puthujjana and so I need not repeat them). But this must by no means be taken as a denigration or depreciation of the Laws but rather the opposite; for I fancy it is more important (given the aim of understanding how [things] are in order to elicit fully the futility of existence and so eliminate taṇhā) to have access to the structure also of avijjā than to possess the structure of ñāṇa which last, in fact, could be defined as valuable in proportion to its having that access (Socrates and ignorance, for instance).
I am far too inexpert in logic to comment on whether the proposition "AB implies A" is or is not properly speaking a deductive proposition. I accept what the logicians tell me on this point. However this occurs to me: Although it may tell one nothing new (being a truism), still it may exhibit a structure. Good. But any structure it is as a proposition, capable of exhibiting directly or indirectly, is necessarily dependent on the self-identity of A; for without that it just doesn't convey. But the essence of self-identity is the ambiguity. But the essence of self-identity is the ambiguity of two-in-one: the self which is the same as its own self is no other than itself. (Incidentally, while cogito ergo sum is regardable rightly, I take it, as a description, how can the proposition "AB implies A" be taken in any sense as a description? Is it not a statement proper to one of Eddington's Super Mathematicians who never know what they are talking about? As such, it can scarcely be said to describe even nothing (though maybe that is precisely what it does), and is a description that does not describe describable as a description of nothing? I think perhaps it is. Perhaps this is what we want.
Self-identity: Kierkegaard, you may remember, says this:—
To abstract from existence is to remove the difficulty. To remain in existence is to understand one thing in one moment and another thing in another moment, is not to understand oneself. But to understand the greatest oppositions together, and to understand oneself existing in them, is very difficult. (C.U.O., p. 316)
Kierkegaard again—
The self is freedom. But freedom is the dialectical element in the terms of possibility and necessity. (Sickness Unto Death, p. 162)
and
Self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude which relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself.... But to become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete means neither to become finite nor infinite. For that which is to become concrete is a synthesis. Accordingly development consists in moving away from oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself, and the returning to oneself finitely by the process of finitizing. If on the contrary, the self does not become itself, it is in despair, whether it knows it or not. However, a self, every moment it exists, is in process of becoming; for the self kata dynamin (potentially) does not actually exists; it is only that which is to become. In so far as the self does not become itself, it is not its own self; but not to become oneself is despair. (p. 162)
Also:—
Personality is a synthesis of possibility and necessity. The condition of survival is therefore analogous to breathing (respiration), which is an in- and an ex-spiration. The self of the determinist cannot breathe; for it is impossible to breathe necessity also, which taken pure and simple suffocated the human self. (p. 73)
So much for K. on Self. One must, of course, in this questioning (or doubting) of self-identity in being be constantly aware of the risk, greatest at this point, of mauvaise foi creeping surreptitiously in.
Si la mauvaise foi est possible, c'est qu'elle est la menace immediate et permanente de tout projet de l'être humain, e'est que la conscience recèle en son être un risque permanent de mauvaise foi. Et l'origine de ce risque, c'est que la conscience, a la fois et dans son être est ce qu'elle n'est pas[a] et n'est pas ce qu'elle est.[b] (L'Etre et le Néant, p. 111)[8]
This, however, need not stultify our efforts, and we need only keep on our guard.
If we return to the positive proposition "AB implies A", we can equally well assert the negative contrary "AB does not imply A". That the first is "true", and the second "false" cannot be established by reference to what the statement describes , since it describes nothing: if called false because "self-contradictory" that depends on the assumed non-ambiguity of the self-identity assumed of A (by the logical constant) which logic cannot question (assumption = upādāna, and upādānapaccayā bhavo). For every positive proposition a corresponding negative can be asserted, and decision in favour of one against the other can only be made by appeal to what is outside logic or by appeal to the assumed unquestionability of the logical constants assumed. Frequently, it would seem that if a logical statement is to be accepted unsupported for incorporation into the building of a structure, on its own merits alone, it must be brought in with its shadow, its contrary, whose exclusion cannot be justified. But Existentialism puts being into question, and the capula is, is being on the verbal level.
My point here is simply that when a built-up stands, as a structure dialectically suported unilaterally against its contrary annihilating structures, if it rests at any level on a logical statement alone for the closing of the dialectic, such as "AB implies B", then it rests upon an ambiguity. If that ambiguity is overlooked, trouble may arise. If recognized, it can be handled. That logic, within its limits and with awareness of its limitations, is a not only useful but necessary instrument for straightening one's thoughts and building a structure, I would never deny. The constants of logic are certain percisely because they are unilaterally closed dialectics that are what form this valuable instrument, but a dialectic in being (existence) can only be (unilaterally) closed (resolved) by belief (saddhā) in one side or by ignorance (avijjā) of one side. This is outside logic. You say (in your letter of 28 Dec.) (rightly) "What we assume (to be true) is, when we translate it from logical to existential language unquestionable". Agreed; for assuming we refrain from questioning (we close a dialectic unilaterally by the belief of ignorance, voluntarily or not, aware or not). But it is the essence of Existentialism to put Being into question and so how can I possibly make an exeption of the logical copula is or the question of self-identity? Whether "we cannot assume a proposition and doubt it at the same time" is doubtless correct on any one level; but what about on different levels? What about non-commutation?
I think that Science, within its own limits, is a perfectly valid technique, producing a certain type of experiential results from causes in the probable world of things, precisely on account (a) of the scientists' own blinkers which are their discipline, (b) owning to the nature of human existence-in-the-world allowing that interpretation to be placed on it. If science and its professed aims to bring about events in the world of things are considered valuable, then scientific technique would seem unquestionably the best available (for those who have no magical powers) to produce the scientific results desired. But Science's inherent incompleteness (its scientific strength) humiliates ambitious Scientists, and so they make distant claims. Hence the "futile and misleading inferential arguments of logicians and scientists". Personally I am not at all interested in "causes" beyond noting that the "caused" world of actions (kammapatha), persons (puggala) and things (bhūta) is an appearance—that is, a mode in which phenomena can be apprehended. But Hume has said pretty well all that need be said about that, hasn't he? That is ayoniso manasikāra in one of its forms. Also I am not at all interested in "Ultimate entities" whether "ambiguities" or not, and I do not regard the Mahāvhūta, for instance, or anything else, as "ultimate entities", as the "foundation-stones on which the universe is built", or any such curiosity. No phenomenon, surely, is any more "ultimate" than any other qua phenomenon, though some arrangements, if made object of faith, mislead. I do not remember ever saying that I regarded giddiness as an (or the) "absolute term" and certainly did not intend to convey that. Is angst an "ultimate entity"? I do not remember to have discussed giddiness in relation to motion, and the connexion remains unexplained as far as I am concerned, though that does not disturb me. I do not regard angst, or taṇhā even, as "absolute ultimate terms" because I do not much like the phrase at all, much less giddiness. No doubt a system could be built on it, but I am not at all fond of systems, and I have always thought Freud's weakest point was his system and its unilateralistic "absolute ultimate" sex. A point arises here perhaps. It is impossible to exist without assuming-and-consuming (upādānapaccayā bhavo), so the proposal to "exist on the right lines" is not to be taken in the sense of the opening, or the closing, of all dialectics ( resolving of all ambiguities). As I see it, because I exist, certain dialectics are closed and I cannot open them like that in this life. But certain dialectics it remains open to me to close or open. The Dhamma, it seems to me, recognizing this, recomends opening bhava to question (one should be a [...[9]] not only of the Tathāgata but of existence; for the first leads to the second), and the deliberate unilateral pattern of closing of certain dialectics is indicated by the Eightfold Path. Do you agree? This is done by Faith (which is why it is said somewhere that one undertakes sīla by means of the saddhindiya primarily). The chosen aim of that choice is the ending of taṇhā, and any building of a structure must have this aim in view. This aim and this discipline convert existence to point to nirodha.
I think your rendering of ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ by "invariant of a transformation" so good that it can scarcely be improved on, though it is not grammatically parallel to the Pali. The grammatical structure of the Pali is "transformation of an invariant". Both contain a dialectic (ambiguity). It is this: either the invariant is itself undergoing transformation, is being transformed, or it is the untransformed invariant in the transformation, against which the transformation emerges, and vice versa. This brings me to the four pañhā: I at present favour the following renderings (or expressions): pañho = dialectic; ekaṃsavyākaraṇīya = (dialectic) that can (should) be unilaterally closed, ambiguity that can be resolved with benefit (given one's aim): e.g. puñña, not apuñña, the eight sammattāni of the Path, not the eight micchāttāni, etc.; vibhajjavyākaraṇīya = (dialectic) that should be displayed on both sides (but not necessarily closed), ambiguity that should be brought to light (but not necessarily resolved). This is the didactic communication of the dialectic (ambiguity); paṭipucchavyākaraṇīya = the same as the last, but is the existential communication of the dialectic (ambiguity) by the other is prompted to disclose it to himself for himself. (If communicated directly this communication destroys both and is no communication—see K. in C.U.P.). Ṭhapanīya[10] is simply any projet de mauvaise foi, which must be left alone. How does this strike you?
About the glass shelves (which I do not take to be presented as an argument by analogy) I think this excellent: I ask myself: what is in common between (a) the glass shelves, and (b) the conscience (de) soi des glass shelves? The answer I give myself is ?nothing—they have a what in common, and that is nothing (rien). Right?
To return to the tone of this letter, what I am anxious to avoid is any note of depreciation of structure, which I claim to regard as every bit as important as you do. I merely put forward my views expressed above for that purpose and in order to explore the dialectic of logic, and its limits. What interests me in ambiguity, specially (as I suppose you in structure, specially) is the exploration and exploration of it as a means to exposing the futility of existence (the pleasantest of tastes, really) in order to dry up need (taṇhā) for bhava and vibhava. If it suits you rersonally to emphasize the structural mode, it suits me, perhaps, also to emphasize the ambiguity of self-identity. But I think we are talking about the same thing; for isn't ambiguity the mechanism (or mortar) of construction, of which phenomena are the bricks? And your "superposition" is, I fancy, a name for what my "ambiguity" refers to. If not, how not?...
__________
[1] interpretation: Word illegible.
[2] percipiens non est: 'The perceiver is not.'
[3] Non-esse est percipere: 'Not to be is to perceive.'
[4] cogito ergo percipimur: Logically incorect. Possibly cogito ergo percipiur ('I think, therefore I am perceived') is meant. (as the text stands, it means 'I think, therefore we are perceived'.)
[5] percipiens quis perceptum est non esse: This is bad Latin. Perhaps the intended meaning is 'the perceiver, who is perceived not to be", but grammar is ambiguous and incorrect.
[a] conscience d'autrui[6]
[b] ma conscience[7]
[6] conscience d'autrui: 'consciousness of others.'
[7] ma conscience: 'my consciousness'
[8] Si la mauvaise...: 'If bad faith is possible, it is because it is an immediate, permanent threat to every project of the human being; it is because consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk of bad faith. The origin of this risk is the fact that the nature of consciousness simultaneously is to be what it is not and not to be what it is.' (being and Nothingness, Methuen, p. 70).
[9] ...: Illegible.
[10] Ṭhapanīya: 'That (which) should be put aside.'
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