In particular, I note that you say that phenomena, in order to emerge at all, must be distinguishable from what they are not. I agree. But you go on to say that it is from being that they are distinguished. I am not sure whether I should disagree. Without doing so, I shall state that I find that what phenomena are not is other phenomena. My view of being is this: the present single directly perceived phenomenon (whatever it may be) appears against a background of other phenomena that it is not, and these other phenomena are peripherally perceived, not directly perceived. They are absent not present; possible, not certain. But this background itself appears as directly perceived relative to a further background, which further background is thus doubly peripheral, doubly absent; with regard to the original single phenomenon. And this further background has itself got another, still further, background against which it appears, and so on ad infinitum. This is the hierarchy (or one aspect of it). To illustrate this, the picture of squares within squares will serve, and you may now regard it, as you suggest, as an advancing pyramid with diminishing sections. Each section is standing out as a single phenomenon against the background of the next larger section, which represents, all the (limited) immediate possibilities of, or alternatives to, the smaller section within it. The relation is essentially part-to-whole, repeated indefinitely. Now, Berkeley's esse est percipi, takes account of the single immediately present phenomenon that you happen to have started with (i.e. by ignoring the fact that this given phenomenon is itself a background to a still more present phenomenon). That is to say, if I am actually looking at the tree in the quad, it exists (according to Berkeley); but it is assumed that when I stop looking at it, it ceases to be perceived and therefore to exist (if we forget God). This, I maintain, is a mistake. The tree, though no longer directly perceived, no longer present, is still a possibility; that is to say, it is one of the absent phenomena in one of the 'receding' backgrounds. It is never totally absent, for each order of absence is present against (or relative to) a still more absent background. This means that there is not just existence or non-existence of a given object, but an infinite hierarchy of possibilities of existence, ranging from immediate presence (or full existence), through immediate absence or possibility, to ever more remote possibilities. Berkeley, on the one hand, maintains that only the present object exists; the Realists, on the other hand, maintain that all things, present or absent, exist equally. These are the two extreme views, and the truth (I hold) lies in between (as I have described). I notice that you have queried the words underlined in my statement "to be is to be phenomenal—i.e. to appear or to be capable of appearing". Perhaps what I have just said will make this clear: if I had restricted myself to equating existence (or phenomenality) with direct appearance only (and had ignored the possibility of being present) I should have erred with Berkeley. (In the sense that absent phenomena—"images"—also are perceived, we can agree with esse est percipi; but that is not how it is usually understood—Berkeley would hardy allow that the tree can be perceived as absent or as possible or rather that, if not present, it always is so perceived.)
Now, in Stebbing, the question of the existence of the unicorn that I am now thinking of is raised. Prof, Moore's intentionally bogus statement is quoted, namely that 'in one sense of the words there certainly are no unicorns... yet there must be some other sense in which there are such things, since if not, we could not think of them'. This statement is intended to ridicule the view (i.e. that unicorns must exist if they can be thought of) it apparently puts forward. But the point is, how can it be said that there certainly are no unicorns? How can this be known? The most that can be said is that it is highly improbable that any unicorn can be found in any corner of the globe. But what has that to do with the question of existence? This is an excellent example of the wallowing in common sense that is such a marked, and indeed essential, feature of rationalistic and scientific thinking. The fact is that if I am thinking of a unicorn, then a unicorn exists as a possibility, and if I am thinking of a horse then a horse exists as a possibility. If I see a unicorn (or a horse) then that unicorn (or horse) exists as a certainty. (Naturally, if I think of a unicorn there will also be other, reflexive, determinations playing their part, and I shall regard the unicorn I am thinking of as less probable than the horse I am thinking of. But this is irrelevant.) Stebbing then says that it is meaningless to assert the existence of an individual ('this lion exists'), but not meaningless to assert the existence of a class ('lions exist'). But as I think, 'this lion exists' means 'this lion is certain' and 'lions exist' means 'this lion is possible'. Some confirmation of this second is given, unwittingly, by Russell's statement ' "lions exist" means "X is a lion" is sometimes true" '—the logical, point-of-viewless expression 'is sometimes true', becomes, existentially, 'is possible'. And if this is so, then the proposition 'lions exist' means 'I am thinking of a lion'. Unhappy logicians!
But to proceed. Let me restate the three Laws of Thought.
1. Either p or not-p, excluding the possibility of both. (p/p̄*)
2. Either p or not-p, not excluding the possibility of neither. (p v p̄*)
3. Not both p and not-p, not excluding the possibility of neither.
N.B. It must be remembered that p is a proposition in this formulation.
Now it will not have escaped your notice (or will it?) that the tetrad hoti tathāgato parammaraṇa, namely:
(i) The Tathāgata exists (after death)
(ii) The Tathāgata does not exist... = 1
(iii) The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist... =2
(iv) The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist.... =3
exemplifies these Laws of Thought. No doubt this tetrad was a logical font that was much squabbled about and not much understood. But let us see if we can make sense of it. In (i) the Tathāgata is asserted. Note that in saying 'A exists' I am asserting A, and I am not asserting A's existence: to assert A's existence I must say 'A's existence exists'. Or we can put it this way: 'A exists' is equivalent to 'there is A', and 'A's existence exists' is equivalent to 'there is A's existence'. But in asserting A I am saying, in effect, 'A is the invariant of a transformation known as existence'; that is to say in asserting g A I am defining existence. In (ii) the Tathāgata is denied. But this, coming after (i), is the second part of a transformation of which (i) was the first part. In other words, when (i) and (ii) are together asserted (iii) "both"—the relation between them, i.e. the transformation, is asserted. That is to say, (iii) asserts the Tathāgata's existence—"The Tathāgata's existence exists". Note, however, that existence is taken here in the Berkeleyan sense: (i) = "The Tathāgata is present (either—by himself "I am a Tathāgata" or to another—"this is a Tathāgata"); (ii) = "The Tathāgata is absent"; (iii) = "The Tathāgata's presence is present". And in (iv) "neither" the Tathāgata's existence is denied—"The Tathāgata's existence does not exist", or "The Tathāgata's presence is absent". But it is evident that we could go on to assert (iii) and (iv) together, which would be asserting the existence of the Tathāgata's existence "The existence of the Tathāgata's existence exists". And we could then deny (iii) and (iv), and then assert both assertion and denial of (iii) and (iv), and so on indefinitely. But in doing this we shall be generating the hierarchy in terms of existence, just as I described earlier with the squares within the squares. Whether we use the Laws of Thought or the ancient Indian logical tetrad, we find we can arrive at the structure of being.
Now Stebbing uses the Laws of Thought to define the negative, so: given p and q, if (a) either p or q is true, not excluding both, and (b) not both p and q are true, not excluding neither, then we have "either p or q, exclusive of both";in this case, q is not-p. As far as it goes, this is well done; but this is as far as it goes. In their mania for common-sense interpretations the modern logicians have destroyed whatever structural value the traditional formal logic possessed. Stebbing for example, wants to give the proposition p any everyday value—e.g. "the time is four o'clock" (to take a random example). But this makes nonsense of "either p or not-p, not excluding the possibility of both"; for we get either the time is four o'clock or the time is not four o'clock, and perhaps it is both four o'clock and not four o'clock". This being unsatisfactory, I was wondering what sort of proposition could be used for p that would avoid absurdity.[a]
Looking through Stebbing's book I eventually came across (p. 59) the following diagram (called the 'square of opposition'):—
What immediately struck me about this trapezium (as I hope it will already have struck you) was that it was remarkably like the little picture I have been sending you to illustrate the structure of ambiguity, namely;
And, if you remember, I said that it was this very figure that was defined by the three Laws of Thought. So it occurred to me that the four propositions placed (by the traditional logicians! at the four corners might be what I was looking for. They are:-
A. All x is y.
E. All x is not-y (i.e. no x is y).
I. Some x is y.
O. Some X is not-y.
And, in fact, if we take p as A ('All x is y') then the trapezium represents the structure of the first Law of Thought (p/p̄) as dependent upon the second and third. And these Laws are now intelligible. Thus the second becomes 'Either some x is y or some x is not y, and perhaps both some x is y and some x is not-y', where the 'both' clearly expresses a possibility; and the third becomes 'Not both all x is y and no x is y and perhaps neither all x is y nor no x is y', where the 'neither' is intelligible (since if some x is y and some x is not-y' then certainly neither all x is y nor no x is y).
It is tempting to try and represent these four propositions by the following scheme:—
XY = A (all x is y)
XȲ* = E (all x is not-y)
YX = I (not: all x is y = some x is y)
Ȳ*X = O (not: all x is not-y = some x is not-y)
But there is a snag. To arrive at O from A in the scheme, you must go via E (XY → XY* → Y*X) and not via I (which gives XY → YX → YX*). Y*X is 'some x is y'; but YX* is 'not: some x is y', which must be turned round as 'all y is not-x'. And these two statements are by no means equivalent. This being so, the trapezium cannot be completed and remains thus:—
which expresses a contradiction (you cannot get to O via I and get to O via E), but not an ambiguity (which requires a 'both'). In order to arrive at a scheme that will faithfully represent the relation between A, E, I, and 0, we have to use four letters (V, W, X, Y say) and turn them upside down, (X̄) in pairs. If, instead of V W X Y we use A B C D you will see that we arrive at Eddington's EF—operators. Let us take a random conic from Kummer (No. 6, say) and mark in the appropriate EF operators:—
This gives us the following trapezium:—
whose sides are as follows:
By operating on all with D̄C̄BA, we get the following equivalent figure:—
If we label these so:—
ABCD—A
AB*CD*—E
DCBA—I
D*CB*A—O
you will see that we have a scheme corresponding to that given on p. 291 (with XY = A etc.), but with the difference that you can get to O from A indifferently via E or I. And we get the following figure:—
But since there is a duality between points and lines—two points define a line •————• and two lines define a point 
—it is indifferent whether the letters AEIO are represented by the sides or the angles of the trapezium (or square of opposition). Thus it turns out that the traditional logical AEIO propositions as treated by the traditional logicians have the same structure as Kummer or the EF-operators. In other words, they are capable of representing the structure of the existence of a thing. From my earlier discussion of different orders of existence—Presence, Absence, Double Absence, and so on—the reason for this can be seen quite easily in the following table of corresponding propositions:—
All x is y — A is (fully) Present
All x is not-y — A is Doubly Absent relative to Present
Some x is y — A is Singly Present relative to Doubly Absent
Some x is not-y — A is Singly Absent relative to Present.
There is, as far as I can see, no particular significance in this parallel structure, it simply happens that "some" can be interpreted as halfway between "all" and "none", so that some + some = all. It may be, however, that to understand "some" and "all" additively in terms of being is the only existentially valid Interpretation. (Thus we can validly say A exists more than B, when A is present and B is absent—indeed the principle of superposition is purely additive of being—, but to speak of more men, or all men, is not valid, being an enumeration or generalization without a point of view. To say that A is present and B is absent is, precisely, to say that A is my point of view.) That the laws of Thought (or the Indian tetrad) should represent 'the structure of being is, however, not accidental( for there is no existence without the negative, and they define the negative—the Laws of Thought are Laws of Existence precisely because Thought is Existence(cogito ergo sum). Any statement in terms of the Laws of Thought or of the Indian tetrad is a statement about existence and any statement about existence can be expressed in such terms. Since existence has no application to a Tathāgata, none of the four statements of the Indian tetrad is valid—they cannot be denied, since denial of one simply asserts another, and they cannot be asserted. They are ṭhapanīya. (Your analysis of the four questions is most ingenious, and may be correct—I must think about it.)
It is perhaps noteworthy that the modern logicians do not interpret "all" and "some" additionally (and much less additionally-in-terms-of-being). They maintain that "all" does not imply existence (in their sense), whereas "some" does. "All men are mortal" is held to be assertable whether there are men or not, whereas "some men are philosophers" is held to mean that at least one man is a philosopher. On this argument "some dodos are female", if asserted, asserts that dodos exist, whereas "all dodos are large-beaked", if asserted, does not assert that dodos exist. This seems to be rubbish. More common sense, I fear.
You might think, after this lengthy discussion in the realm of logic, that I am now going to discuss something else. You would be wrong. I have finished with the connexion between the Laws of Thought and the structure of Being (at least for the moment), but not with Stebbing and Logic. You say in your letter that you are too inexpert to say whether "AB implies A" is a deductive proposition or not, and that you are prepared to accept what the logicians tell you on this point, even if they change their minds. Unhappily Stebbing does change her mind on this point, to the extent of two flatly contradictory statements on opposite pages. You ask, most pertinently, whether the truth of the proposition "AB implies A" arises. The whole point is that it does not arise, and consequently it is not deductive. Stebbing, however, has an axe to grind, and falls between two stools (though why one should need two stools In order to grind an axe, I don't know). Let me expand and expound.
Owing, no doubt, to the rationalist faith that all things are rational, if they are not emotional, Stebblng wishes to maintain that mathematics is a science—a pure science, as opposed to empirical science (do you not already smell a rat?)—, and states that mathematics differs from the other sciences because the facts it deals with are not empirical facts. And since it deals with facts it is deductive, though since these facts are not empirical, it is not also inductive as the empirical sciences are. Mathematics is a purely deductive science. That is more or less how she puts the matter in one rather chatty chapter. My heart bleeds for Stebbing—what else can she say? If mathematics (and therefore Logic) is not a science, it might——oh horror!— be a religion. Now Stebbing says, later on, that a sharp distinction must be made between propositions with regard to matters of fact (which include all the propositions asserted by the natural sciences, and are reached by inductive reasoning) and propositions with regard to abstract concepts such as those of mathematics (I underline). In other words, we must distinguish between facts that are matters of fact, and facts that are the concepts of mathematics, the latter facts being, presumably, not matters of fact. (By now the rat has become so smelly that the cat is out of the bag—mathematics does not deal with facts. However, we anticipate.) Propositions concerning natters of fact may be denied without contradiction: the propositions of mathematics, not being matters of fact, cannot be denied without contradiction, because "they are true no matter what the constitution of the actual world may be". To assert the truth of such propositions is to assert that they follow from the initial concepts and axioms. To assert the truth of propositions regarding matters of fact "is to assert that they express facts with regard to what exists". So Stebbing now admits that there is a difference between asserting the truth of a mathematical proposition and asserting the truth of a proposition regarding matters of fact. Several pages later Stebbing goes further (I quote in full):—
There is a fundamental difference between inference by logical principles from asserted natters of fact, and inference by logical principles from purely logical propositions.[b] The latter cannot be asserted in the same sense as a proposition concerning a matter of fact can be asserted. Thus we may say that we do not assert the truth of mathematics; we assert the validity of the logical structure exhibited by the system of mathematical propositions.
And finally, there is a footnote to this passage:—
It is for this reason that mathematics cannot be regarded as a system of true propositions; it is a structure.
But when we turn back to her statement of the Principles of Deduction we find this:—
What is implied by a true proposition is true. This is called the principle of deduction since it is in virtue of this principle alone that we can deduce a conclusion.... It might equally well be called the principle of assertion....
What could be clearer? Mathematics has nothing to do with true propositions, and there is deduction only from true propositions. (And if mathematics is a structure how can it be a science?) So she is obliged, on p. 192, to say that
The formal principles stated above in terms of implication suffice for the construction of deductive systems, but they do not suffice for the drawing of conclusions;
and on page 193 to say that
The principle of deduction and principle of substitution[c] are involved in all demonstrative reasoning. Without these two principles it would be impossible to construct a deductive system[d]
And she adds:—
The development of the primitive propositions stated in Principia Mathematica takes place in virtue of the repeated use of these two principles.
Nonsense!
At this point I venture to disagree with you. You say that
for every positive statement or proposition a corresponding negative can be asserted, and a decision in favour of one against the other can only be made by appeal to what is outside logic.... Consequently it would seem that if a logical statement is to be admitted on its own merits alone and unsupported for incorporation into the building of a structure, it must be admitted along with its contradictory opposite, whose exclusion in these conditions cannot be justified.
Certainly, for every positive statement or proposition a corresponding negative can be asserted, provided it is clear that the positive statement or proposition has been asserted. If it has not been asserted, how can its negative be asserted? With Stebbing's argument, much of which is taken from Hume, I agree. It is only propositions regarding matters of fact that can be either asserted or denied, and it is also only propositions regarding matters of fact that can be used "for incorporation into the building of a structure"; and provided your statement concerns only propositions regarding matters of fact I entirely agree with you. But your statement is made in connexion with the proposition "AB implies A", which we both agree is not a proposition regarding matters of fact. What I am getting at is this. A logician such as Russell, may imagine that in writing his Principia Mathematica he is employing deductive reasoning. It flatters him to think that he has" abandoned the appeal to intuition" and "made all his assumptions explicit". That is why Stebbing insists that mathematics (and logic) is a "deductive science" while at the same time clearly showing that it is nothing of the sort. What, however, is really happening (apart from incidental short cuts in descriptions) is this. The mathematician or logician, when determining the valid principles of mathematics or logic, is performing an act of reflexion bringing into view the structure of existence, and describing whatever parts of that structure he is interested in. Thus he does not incorporate a proposition such as "AB implies A" into the building of structure; he sees a certain structural characteristic that he proceeds to describe as "AB implies A". Sartre has (correctly) pointed out that the data of reflexion are certain, and apart from errors of description no mistake can be made. If reflexion reveals ambiguities, then these ambiguities are certain and not ambiguous. If reflexion reveals a structure describable as "AB implies A", then there can be no doubt about the matter. Or rather there can be doubt about it, and this doubt about what is certain constitutes mauvaise foi. The most obvious example is the rationalist who, though he is certain that he exists (in virtue of the cogito), refuses to admit the certainty of his existence and takes refuge (as Kierkegaard points out) in (rational) thought, which is the subtlest way of not existing (this is the situation of A in Either/Or). What is deceptive is the insistence of the logicians that "AB implies A" is a deductive proposition, with the subsequent confusion of a formal logical principle, with a deductive logical conclusion. The former is certain and can only be doubted by mauvaise foi; the latter is probable, and can only not be doubted by mauvaise foi. Quantum Mechanics, as Dirac shows, rest upon assumptions contrary to logical principles; it thus incorporates mauvaise foi into its equations. Quantum phenomena threaten the scientific observer with existence, and the measures that he takes not to exist are known as the Principles of Quantum Mechanics. They stop the infection from spreading above the sub-atomic level. The expression "a logical statement" (with its partner "a logical argument") is most unfortunate, since it entirely fails to distinguish between logical principles and logical conclusions. The latter are either asserted or denied as true or false: the former can be neither asserted nor denied, they are neither true or nor false, but simply there if we look reflexively. Another source of confusion is the fact that in order to express these certain logical principles use has to be made of the verb "to be", with the result that these logical principles when expressed look grammatically like logical conclusions. The copula "is" looks the same in "every right angle is an angle" as it does in "every swan is white", but in the second proposition "is" represents an assertion, whereas in the first it does not (except by analogy—see later). So long as you consider that "AB implies A" is an assertion (and from your letter I gather that you do—you describe it, for example, as "a logical unilateral statement"), we shall not agree. Yet, as I noted above, you query whether the truth of "AB implies A" arises: but this is to doubt whether, in fact, "AB implies A" is an assertion. And how can a statement whose truth does not arise be unilateral? You will, perhaps, gather that I regard this question as being of fundamental importance, and I, for my part, gather that you regard it so, too. It may be that our differences here are the source of any others that we may have. Let me state my view clearly. It may be mauvaise foi not to doubt a statement that is only possible, that is a proposition regarding a matter of fact, that is a logical conclusion, that is, in brief, an assertion; but it is quite certainly mauvaise foi, the dangerous rationalist mauvaise foi, to doubt a statement that is certain, that is a reflexive description of structure, that is a logical principle, that is in brief, not an assertion. And it is because logicians do doubt such statements that all "logical statements" are logical conclusions; and since any verbal statement is a "logical statement", we conclude that no utterance can ever express certainty. An utterance can express certainty, but it is then not an assertion—and I do not mean in the sense of Kierkegaard's existential communication, unless that is understood to mean that we can only communicate certainties by means of analogy (perhaps it does mean that). A communication by analogy resembles an assertion in that the statement of the analogy is an assertion (e.g. 'viññāṇa "becomes" nāma'), but the assertion is not assertion of the certainty (thus, far from stressing "become" in that communication, I say regretfully that I am obliged to use the word in order to communicate, but would do without it if I could). Thus, in "AB implies A" we have communication of a certainty by means of an analogy——"AB implies A", on the surface is an assertion such as "fire is hot and will heat you if you go close", i.e. "AB causes A". "A is A" communicates by means of analogy—it is ostensibly the assertion that "A has the property of being A": heat, for example, has the property of being hot, as you can demonstrate by applying a thermometer to what feels hot. It can, of course, be taken at its face value, and this is done by regarding it as an assertion, and in this way there is no harm done. But rationalists have the attitude that it must be taken at its face value, that a statement cannot not be an assertion. The most usual form of communication by analogy (which is never argument by analogy) is the parable, but it is not generally understood that the parabola is also a form of such communication. (Thus the conics in Kummer communicate certain major aspects of the structure of being, in the form of analogy. Kummer asserts things about points and lines and conics, but communicates fundamental structure of being.) I realize that in this way of looking at things, any communication by analogy is, in a sense, a logical principle. But though there is no boundary between formal logic and mathematics, there does seem to be a boundary between mathematics and, for example, Joyce's Ulysses, which is also unmistakably a communication by analogy. The difference is that mathematics is a structure whose description begins at the most fundamental point (the Laws of Thought defining the negative), whereas literary works begin anywhere in experience and do not pretend to communicate the whole structure. Thus, though perhaps "logical principles" can be conveniently confined to a few of the simpler and more obvious levels of mathematical communication by analogy, there is no reason other than convenience for stopping short of the whole of mathematics. But, also, there is no good reason for extending the term beyond mathematics into literary or other similar forms of communication by analogy. We may note that the Suttas provide both forms, sometimes in the same sentence. Another way of distinguishing between an assertion (or denial) and a non-assertion is the fact that a non-assertion always begs the question—which is why it is a non-assertion. Now any statement can be regarded either as begging the question or not (a psycho-analyst regards all his patient's statements as begged questions), though normally it is clear which is intended. The proof[e] that any statement can be regarded either as an assertion (not begging the question) or as a non-assertion (begging the question) runs as follows (by statement we mean proposition):—From the earlier part of this letter it is clear that a proposition p in its simplest form is an assertion "A exists"; and we showed that this asserts A and, in doing so, defines existence. If we change our attitude, putting "A" in brackets, we shift the emphasis and get "[A] exists". This is simply " 'A exists' defines 'existence' " which is of the form "AB implies A", which begs the question (is a non-assertion). But you will see without this that "A exists" is not an assertion of a matter of fact. Thus "The Tathāgata exists" or "The Tathāgata's existence exists" clearly does not beg the question (the second of these is less clear than the first, since it could well be taken in the sense "The Tathāgata's [or anyone else's] existence exists"), whereas "Existence exists" clearly does. For this reason a communication by analogy appears to a rationalist as a fallacious argument.
The other night, at about half-past twelve, I was woken by a curious flapping noise over my head. I got up and investigated, and discovered on the bed under the mat under my pillow a smallish but extremely venomous-looking snake devouring a gecko. (Do I hear you wondering how a snake can look venomous? The answer is that any snake that you find on your bed at midnight looks incredibly venomous. This one was shiny brown with rather indeterminate yellow rings.) Fortunately, having its mouth full of no doubt delicious gecko it allowed itself to be caught and removed without giving any trouble. I can't help feeling that that wretched gecko must have had an appointment with the snake, if the snake took all the trouble to come in and look under my pillow. The next morning was spent in taking away the gaps I found under my kuṭi door and the caṅkamana gate.
We have just had some unexpected heavy rain. This is most welcome in providing me with bath water for the next three or four months. Unfortunately my cistern has not yet been treated to stop its leaking, and I did not bother to collect any rainwater. What is needed is half a bag of cement. This has been on its way since the middle of November, but still remains a project. I am not inclined, however, to curse at Ceylonese inefficiency, since it is undoubtedly one of the reasons why one can live here in peace and unmolested. Preserve me from a country where the people are united and efficient!
A few scraps of 'Daily Telegraph' describing the French crisis. Extraordinarily stuffy and panicky about the affair. The Algiers instigators were described as "idealists and adventurers". Surely Churchill (is he still alive?) is, or was, an idealist and adventurer? This is the same sort of panic as inspired the Suez débâcle. If England can't adapt herself better than this to changing conditions she won't last long. Why didn't she support Nasser against America? This is simply trying to keep the tide out with a mop instead of harnessing it to generate power. However, it is none of my business.
The 'Journal de Charlevoi', my usual provincial Belgian paper (my provincial English paper is the 'Liverpool Echo', most dreary), tells me, with an air of disapproval, that the Swedes are noted for their erotic films, usually shown only in low-class cinemas. This is a little unexpected somehow—perhaps the Swedes are now so bored that they are sinking into debauchery, or were they always debauched? Why does a Rotterdam paper give great apace to the account of an English Country Cricket Match (next to an article on Gide who, surely, did not play tile game)?...
__________
[*] The * after the letter indicate a line on the letter.
[a] It is clear that p must have a particular structure for the Laws of Thought to apply to it, namely, the structure of a Thought (whatever that may be). What, in other words, is the nature of a proposition? It turns out that p must be an assertion of a thing, A: 'A exists'. This, as we shall see, can be formally represented by the proposition “All x is y”.
[b] Stebbing has just defined mathematics as 'the science concerned with “deduction by logical principles from logical princples”.'
[c] Which are excluded from the formal orinciples of implication.
[d] I underline.
[e] This is a communication by analogy, so do not take “proof” at its face value.
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